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Leakage-Resilient Password Entry Schemes
for Smart Glasses∗
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ABSTRACT
Smart glasses are becoming popular for users to access various ser-
vices such as email. To protect these services, password-based
user authentication is widely used. Unfortunately, the password-
based user authentication has inherent vulnerability against pass-
word leakage. Many efforts have been put on designing leakage-
resilient password entry schemes on PCs and mobile phones with
traditional input equipment including keyboards and touch screen-
s. However, such traditional input equipment is not available on
smart glasses. Existing password entry on smart glasses relies on
additional PCs or mobile devices. Such solutions force users to
switch between different systems, which causes interrupted experi-
ence and may lower the practicability and usability of smart glass-
es. In this paper, we propose a series of leakage-resilient pass-
word entry schemes on stand-alone smart glasses, which are gTap-
per, gRotator, and gTalker. These schemes ensure no leakage in
password entry by breaking the correlation between the underlying
password and the interaction observable to adversaries. They are
practical in the sense that they only require a touch pad, a gyro-
scope, and a microphone which are commonly available on smart
glasses. The usability of the proposed schemes is evaluated by us-
er study under various test conditions which are common in users’
daily usage. The results of our user study reveal that the proposed
schemes are easy-to-use so that users enter their passwords within
moderate time, at high accuracy, and in various situations.
Keywords
Leakage-resilient password entry; eavesdropping attack; smart
glasses
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, smart glasses are becoming popular commodities.
Promising applications of smart glasses include Augmented Reali-
ty (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR). By wearing smart glasses, users
can access various services, such as personal email and online so-
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cial network, in a hand-free manner at any place and at any time. To
defeat unauthorized access to these services, password-based user
authentication has been widely used for users’ identity verification.
Unfortunately, the password-based user authentication has its in-
trinsic vulnerability against password leakage. This threat is severe
as smart glasses are usually used in various environments such as
public areas and outdoors that are vulnerable to password leakage.
In order to thwart the threat of password leakage, prior research
improves the leakage resilience of password entry on PCs and mo-
bile devices [8, 13, 6]. Despite two decades of intensive research,
most systems were broken soon after their proposals, while the
remnants are very difficult to use (some schemes take up to 221
seconds per login attempt) [6, 17]. To achieve high security and us-
ability, it is necessary to use a protected environment to hide certain
user interaction during password entry [16]. However, these works
require keyboards or touch screens as traditional input equipmen-
t. They are not suitable for password entry on smart glasses due
to the following reasons. Firstly, the traditional input equipment is
not available on the smart glasses due to compact and lightweight
design. Secondly, the screen of the smart glasses is much smaller
than monitors on PCs and touch screens on mobile devices. Third-
ly, the smart glasses have limited hardware support. Lastly, the s-
mart glasses need to be used in hand-free manner in various indoor
and outdoor environments.
Most of existing password entry methods on smart glasses re-
quire users to type in their passwords via additional PCs or mobile
devices. However, the additional devices may not be always avail-
able in certain scenarios such as public places and outdoors. Even
worse, users are forced to switch between smart glasses and mobile
devices for password entry. The interrupted user experience may
lead to more errors and raise users’ stress and anxiety [1]. On the
other hand, new smart glasses features such as Near-Eye-Display
(NED) screens have been exploited in a recent work for password
entry on Google Glass [15]. While achieving reasonable usability,
the proposed schemes in this work are subject to partial leakage of
passwords as explained in Section 5. Designing leakage-resilient
password systems for smart glasses remains a challenge today.
In this paper, we propose three password entry schemes on s-
mart glasses, which are named gTapper, gRotator, and gTalker, re-
spectively. The three proposed schemes are concise yet effective to
achieve perfect leakage resilience of password entry with accept-
able usability. The NED screen on smart glasses plays an impor-
tant role in our schemes. The NED screen of smart glasses is a
tiny optical instrument which reflects and magnifies the display to
users’ eyes [3]. The NED screen is fixed on the smart glass frame
and placed physically close to the users’ eyes [3]. Due to its com-
pact size and physical proximity to the users’ eyes, the NED screen
can privately display information to users without being observed
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by others. Thus the NED screen is used to deliver hidden infor-
mation, which can break the correlation between the underlying
password and the interaction observable to an adversary. For the
practicability, our schemes only use a touch pad, a gyroscope, and
a microphone which are commonly available on smart glasses. To
enter password, the three schemes require the user to simply perfor-
m gestures on the touch pad, slightly rotate head, or speak numbers
based on the hidden information displayed on the NED screen.
We implement the proposed schemes on Google Glass and e-
valuate them with a user study. The user study considers practical
conditions related to time pressure. These conditions are used to
simulate common situations in users’ daily usage of password en-
try. The experimental results show that users enter their passwords
by our schemes easily with moderate cost of time at high accuracy.
The contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose and implement three leakage-resilient password
entry schemes on smart glasses. Our schemes only require
a touch pad, a gyroscope, and a microphone which are com-
monly available on smart glasses.
• We evaluate the usability of our proposed schemes by con-
ducting a user study on Google Glass.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Background
Smart glasses, such as Google Glass by Google, are playing an
important role in the promising applications of AR and VR. The
smart glasses generally have a built-in operating system, such as
Android Wear, which allows users to access various services, like
email, online chatting, and personalized digital map. In order to
support user interaction, a typical smart glasses is usually equipped
with a tiny head-mounted NED screen and multiple sensors for col-
lecting the information about users and environments, which in-
clude a small touch pad, a gyroscope, and a microphone. Due to
the compact and lightweight design of the smart glasses, tradition-
al input equipments, such as keyboard and touch screen, are not
available on the smart glasses, as these traditional equipments are
too heavy or too large to fit in the smart glasses.
In this work, Google Glass Explorer Edition (XE) 2 is chosen
as the platform for our design, implementation, and evaluation.
Google Glass is powered by Android Glass OS which has common
functionalities of smart glasses and provides Android-based pro-
grammable API. Google Glass is equipped with a 0.5-inch NED
screen (0.75 inch in length and 0.375 inch in width), as shown in
Figure 1. The NED screen is placed approximately 1 inch away
from the user’s eye [3].
Figure 1: The design of Google Glass.
To enable user operation, multiple common sensors are embed-
ded on Google Glass frame, including a touch pad, a gyroscope,
and a microphone. In particular, the 3.25-inch long touch pad
enables gesture-based user operation on Google Glass [3], which
supports simple gestures such as finger tap and finger swipe. As
a head-mounted device, Google Glass also tracks the user’s head
movement by motion sensor (i.e. a gyroscope) and responds ac-
cordingly. For example, the user can select items from a menu
list on Google Glass by rotating his/her head. Another sensor, the
microphone, enables voice commands on Google Glass which sup-
ports speech recognition-based user operation.
2.2 Threat Model
In order to protect various services, the legacy password based
user authentication is widely adopted. However, the password-
based user authentication has intrinsic vulnerability against pass-
word leakage. In password leakage attack, an adversary may dis-
close or infer a victim’s password by observing and analyzing the
victim’s password entry process.
Due to the compact size and light weight of smart glasses, the ex-
isting password entry method employed by smart glasses commodi-
ties always requires users to enter their passwords via additional
PCs with keyboards or mobile phones/tablets with touch screens.
This makes the password entry on smart glasses especially vulner-
able to the password leakage, as the passwords may be captured via
various eavesdropping attacks such as recording camera, malware,
and key logger. Depending on what information can be accessed
by an adversary, the eavesdropping attacks to smart glasses can be
categorized as external eavesdropping and internal eavesdropping.
In external eavesdropping attacks, an adversary can exploit chan-
nels outside smart glasses to obtain the victim’s password. Based
on the exploitable channels, we classify the external eavesdropping
attacks into vision-based attacks, motion-based attacks, and acous-
tics-based attacks. Because smart glasses is often used in various
environments such as open area and outdoor, it is more likely for
the adversary to perform the attacks via these exploitable channels.
In vision-based attacks, an adversary can directly watch or video-
tape a victim’s password entry process such as observing victim’s
finger movements and head movements. The adversary may infer
the password by analyzing the observed movements. Note that the
vision-based attacks do not necessarily require physical proxim-
ity since video surveillance systems are widely deployed in some
public places and even connected to the Internet. The existing pass-
word entry method used on smart glasses is especially vulnerable
to the vision-based attacks, as users are required to enter their pass-
words in plaintext via an additional keyboard or touch screen.
In motion-based attacks, an adversary can estimate and track a
victim’s movements including finger movements and arm move-
ments by additional equipment. Based on the estimated move-
ments, the adversary may infer the input password. The adversary
can remotely launch the attacks without any requirement on the
physical proximity to the victim. The threat of the motion-based
attacks becomes more serious as the boom of smart watches which
can be used to estimate and track users’ finger/arm movements.
Acoustics-based attacks allow an adversary to capture audio sig-
nals in the password entry process. Since speech recognition be-
comes popular and important on mobile phones and smart glasses,
an adversary may have opportunities to launch effective acoustics-
based attacks when voice commands are used in password entry.
On the other hand, internal eavesdropping is more powerful
where an adversary can access internal states of smart glasses (e.g.,
memory and network packets) and infer users’ passwords. Mitiga-
tions to the internal eavesdropping attacks can be securing execu-
tive environment. Our proposed schemes do not address this type
of attacks because it is independent of password entry. Our work
mainly focuses on the external eavesdropping which are directly
linked to password leakage in password entry.
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3. DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section, we present the design of our leakage-resilient
password entry schemes on smart glasses.
3.1 Design Goals
The design goals of our schemes can be explained from security,
practicability, and usability perspectives.
Firstly, the schemes should minimize password leakage during
the password entry process in various environments where an ad-
versary has more opportunities to perform password attacks includ-
ing the external eavesdropping as presented in Section 2.2. The
adversary may infer the input password by analyzing the correla-
tion between the observed information about the password entry
and underlying password. Thus, it is important to decouple the link
between the observation and the underlying input password.
Secondly, the schemes should be pervasively accessible on s-
mart glasses in practical settings. In order to achieve this goal, no
additional devices or external hardware should be involved as the
devices or hardware may not be always available. The schemes
should only use built-in hardware and functionalities that are com-
monly available on existing commodity smart glasses. However,
the built-in hardware and functionalities on smart glasses are rather
resource-limited. The design of the password entry schemes should
meet the challenges of limited resources.
Thirdly, the schemes should preserve the benefits of legacy pass-
word in terms of usability [2]. Thus intuitive and simple operations
are preferable for users perform during password entry.
3.2 Design of Password Entry Schemes
Due to the tiny size and physical proximity to a user’s eye, the
NED screen can be used to display information privately to a us-
er without being noticed by others. Via the touch pad, gyroscope,
and microphone, common user-device interaction channels on s-
mart glasses include finger gestures, head movements, and human
voice, respectively. In the proposed schemes, we take advantage of
these hardware and interaction channels on smart glasses.
In our design, we assume a server and a user agree on a n-length
password pwd = (p1, p2, ..., pn). During pass entry, for each
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, a hidden keypad Γi(·) is privately displayed to
the user by the NED screen on smart glasses. The hidden keypad
Γi(·) defines a random mapping Ω → Φ where Ω is the set of al-
l elements contained in the password alphabet and Φ is the set of
all candidate user operations via a user-device interaction channel.
Note that in each round i, a new random mapping Γi(·) (i.e. a new
hidden keypad) is drawn from the universal set of the candidate
mappings Ω→ Φ following uniform distribution. Secondly, given
the hidden keypad Γi(·), in order to select the correct underlying
password element pi in pwd, the user needs to perform correspond-
ing operations opi = Γi(pi) via the interaction channel.
Since the hidden keypad is privately delivered to the user on the
NED screen, it is difficult for adversaries to compromise this de-
livery channel. The observable response operation opi by the user
for the same password element is uniformly randomized due to the
hidden random keypad Γi(·). Therefore, as long as Γi(·) is not dis-
closed, an adversary cannot obtain any useful information from opi
to infer the underline password element pi through external eaves-
dropping attacks. The detailed security analysis will be provided
later in this section.
During the password entry process, the types of the response op-
erations and the designs of the hidden random mappings vary in
different user-device interaction channels. According to the inter-
action channels, we design and implement three password entry
schemes, which are named as gTapper, gRotator, and gTalker.
3.3 gTapper
gTapper utilizes a small touch pad which accepts users’ finger
gestures as input signals.
In gTapper, the password alphabet Ω is comprised of all single-
digit numbers from 0 to 9. The hidden keypad of gTapper includes
10 numbers as shown in Figure 2(a). In each round i, gTapper ran-
domly selects a number si ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 9} and sets the focus on
si (e.g. 5 is focused in Figure 2(a)) initially while the locations of
the keys in the hidden keypad remain unchanged such that users can
locate the keys easily and swiftly. A user can shift the focus onto
the other numbers in descending or ascending order by swiping for-
ward/backward on the touch pad with one finger, as shown in Fig-
ure 2(b). Thus the focus is shifted onto the number (si−1) mod 10
by swiping forward once with one finger, and the focus is moved
onto the number (si + 1) mod 10 by swiping backward once.
(a) Demonstration of gTapper. (b) The top left figure, bot-
tom left figure, and right fig-
ure show one-finger operations,
two-finger operations, and swip-
ing directions, respectively.
Figure 2: Demonstration of gTapper and gestures
To enter a password element pi ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 9} in round i, a
user needs to shift the focus onto the number pi on the keypad from
the initially focused number si by swiping forward or backward on
the touch pad for opi times, where opi = (si − pi) mod 10 or
opi = (pi − si) mod 10.
An adversary can observe user operations on gTapper including
swiping directions on the touch pad and the number of swiping
operations. In each round, the adversary knows the number and the
directions of shifts from an initially focused number to the element
of the password. However, due to the protected hidden keypad, the
adversary does not know what the initially focused number is and
cannot infer the element of the password. The proof of the analysis
is provided in Appendix A.1.
3.4 gRotator
gRotator relies on a gyroscope on smart glasses and allows the
user to select and enter password elements with head rotation.
In gRotator, the alphabet of password Ω consists of all single-
digit numbers from 0 to 9. The hidden keypad of gRotator contains
two number screens, a small number screen Cs = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
and a big number screen Cb = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9} as shown in Fig-
ure 3(a). At any time, only one number screen is displayed. In each
round i, the positions of the five numbers in each number screen are
randomly shuffled. One of the two number screens is randomly dis-
played as the initial screen. A user can change the number screen
by swiping forward with one finger on the touch pad of the smart
glasses if the i-th underlying password element is not included in
the number screen currently displayed. In order to select a number,
the user needs to rotate his/her head according to the position of the
number on the screen. In particular, the user may select a number
located at top, at bottom, on the left, on the right, or in the center
by raising head, lowering head, rotating head towards left, rotating
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head towards right, or heading upright, respectively, as shown in
Figure 3(b).
(a) Demonstration of gRotator. (b) Head movements in gRotator
Figure 3: Demonstration of gRotator and head movements
To track the user’s head movements, we estimate the user’s head
rotation based on the motion data generated by the gyroscope on
smart glasses. The motion data include angular speeds on three or-
thogonal axes (i.e. axisX , axis Y , and axis Z) in the motion sensor
coordinate system. The typical motion sensor coordinate system
on smart glasses is defined relative to the NED screen. In the sys-
tem, axis X is horizontal, pointing to the right. Axis Y is vertical,
pointing to the up. Axis Z points toward the user’s face. Based
on the angular speed, we estimate the user’s head rotation using a
dead-reckoning algorithm [5]. LetRti = (rx,ti , ry,ti , rz,ti) be the
angular speed generated by the gyroscope at time ti. The rotation
angle along each axis can be calculated by the trapezoidal rule for
integral approximation as follows
θs,ti = (rs,ti−1 + rs,ti) · (ti − ti−1)/2 (1)
where s ∈ {x, y, z}. We calculate angle θx,ti and angle θy,ti of
head rotation. The head rotation direction is determined by com-
paring the angle θx,ti and angle θy,ti with thresholds of ξv and ξh,
respectively. The initial head pose is defined as the user’s frontal
face head pose. The estimation of head rotation direction Hti at
time ti is given below.
Hti =

up θx,ti ≤ (−1) · ξv and |θy,ti | < ξh
down θx,ti ≥ ξv and |θy,ti | < ξh
left θy,ti ≥ ξh and |θx,ti | < ξv
right θy,ti ≤ (−1) · ξh and |θx,ti | < ξv
upright |θx,ti | < ξv and |θy,ti | < ξh
(2)
According to our pilot study, the best performance for determining
head rotation directions can be achieved at ξv = 15◦ and ξh =
25◦. With the head rotation estimation, users can input password
elements by performing corresponding head rotations.
The observed user operations by an adversary include swiping on
the touch pad and head rotations. The adversary may know in each
round whether the user changes the number screen displayed ini-
tially and know the exact positions of the underlying password ele-
ments located in the displayed number screen. However, as long as
the hidden keypad is not disclosed, the adversary would not know
which number screen is chosen by the user nor the mapping be-
tween the 5 numbers and the positions in the screen. So the ad-
versary cannot infer any element of the underlying password. The
proof is presented in Appendix A.2
3.5 gTalker
gTalker uses a built-in microphone and speech recognition tech-
niques, by which smart glasses recognize the content and the mean-
ing of the user’s speech. The implementation of gTalker utilizes an
offline speech recognition function available in Android API to rec-
ognize the user’s speech, .
In gTalker, the alphabet of password is Ω = {0, 1, 2, ..., 9}. The
layout of the hidden keypad of gTalker is shown in Figure 4, where
each white number p is followed by an underlined red number s.
The hidden keypad consists of two keypads, one original keypad
with all white numbers and one transformed keypad with all under-
lined red numbers. In each round i, the positions of white numbers
remain unchanged while the positions of underlined red numbers
shuffle randomly. For each white number pk = k, we use sik to
denote the corresponding underlined red number in round i, where
k ∈ Ω and sik ∈ Ω. For ∀j, k ∈ Ω and j 6= k, sij 6= sik hold-
s. In order to enter an underlying password element k via gTalker,
a user may firstly identify the position of the white number pk in
the original keypad easily and quickly because the positions of the
white numbers follow the traditional layout of number pad and re-
main unchanged. Then, the user should speak out the underlined
red number sik. Finally, gTalker recognizes the number sik spoken
by the user and enters pk based the mapping between the original
keypad and the transformed keypad in that round.
Figure 4: Demonstration of gTalker.
For gTalker, an adversary may know the number spoken by the
user in each round. As long as the transformed keypad is not dis-
closed, the adversary does not know the random mapping between
the original keypad and the transformed keypad. So the adversary
cannot infer the element of the underlying password in each round.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
4. DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUA-
TION
4.1 Data Collection
Our user study recruits 57 participants, including 29 males and
28 females whose ages range between 19 and 28. There are two
parts in the user study.
Firstly, we briefly explain to each participant the purpose of our
study and the operations and gestures used in the three proposed
schemes, including gTapper, gRotator, and gTalker. We provide
each participant with Google Glass and show the tutorials of each
scheme and experiment processes in an interactive step-by-step
manner before the experiments start.
In the second part, each participant is asked to use gTapper, gRo-
tator, and gTalker as three test groups. The order of the three pro-
posed schemes is randomized so as to avoid the learning effect
which could have impact on the performance of the schemes. In
each test group, the participant is required to memorize a password
randomly generated at the beginning. The same password is used
in the same test group. The password is set to a 6-digit PIN, whose
strength has been commonly used protect important services such
as online banking. In case that the participant forgets the assigned
password, we provide a “show the password” function for the three
schemes by swiping up with one finger on the touch pad.
In each test group, there are two tests under different test condi-
tions which evaluate the impact of time pressure during password
entry. We use these test conditions to mimic situations which may
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occur commonly during users’ password entry in daily use. In par-
ticular, the time pressure-related conditions are used to mimic the
situations that the users may need to log into a system/service e-
mergently and complete the password entry process within a time
limit. To simulate the conditions related to time pressure, we intro-
duce a timer to the tests. The timer is designed to give a participant
time pressure by showing how much time is left for the current test.
Based on timer, the following time pressure-related test conditions
are used in our user study.
Normal condition: a participant is required to minimize the failure
rate in a fixed number of login attempts where there is no time limit
enforced. The number of login attempts is 3 in our tests.
Timed condition: a participant is required to achieve as many suc-
cessful logins as possible within a fixed time limit. In the tests, the
time limit for gTapper and gRotator is set to one minute while the
time limit for gTalker is two minutes.
4.2 Experiment Results
Based on the user data, we measure the performance of the pro-
posed schemes by two metrics which are average login time and
login success rates. The average login time evaluates the speed of
a login process while the login success rate evaluates the accuracy
of login attempts. With the metrics, we analyze the impacts of the
test conditions to users’ password entry via the proposed schemes.
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Figure 5: Average login time and single element entry time
Figure 5(a) shows the average time for a successful login under
normal condition for the three schemes. In particular, the average
login time for gTapper is 11.2 seconds, which is generally shorter
than the average login time for the other two schemes, which is 15.6
seconds for gRotator and 21.8 seconds for gTalker, respectively.
In order to investigate the cause of the difference in the average
login time, we examine the distribution of the single element entry
time in the three schemes. As shown in Figure 5(b), the average
time of single element entry for gTapper is 1.63 seconds, which is
shorter than the average time of single element entry for gRotator
and gTalker which are 2.20 seconds and 3.05 seconds, respectively.
Making a tap takes shorter time than rotating head or speaking a
number on Google Glass at the current stage. The average login
success rates in the tests under normal condition are 98.3%, 98.2%,
and 98.2% for gTapper, gRotator, and gTalker, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the comparison of the performance under the two
conditions. Our results show that the participants’ password entry
processes become faster under time pressure. The average time for
a successful login in the tests under timed condition is shorter than
that under normal condition, which is 9.3 seconds for gTapper, 14.1
seconds for gRotator, and 20.1 seconds for gTalker. Similar to the
average login time, the average time of a single element entry also
becomes shorter, which is 1.36 seconds for gTapper, 1.98 seconds
for gRotator, and 2.84 seconds for gTalker.
On the other hand, the average login success rates for gTapper
and gRotator under timed condition are 96.3% and 94.5% respec-
tively, which are lightly lower than the average login success rates
for the two schemes under normal condition, as shown in Fig-
ure 6(b). The average login success rate for gTalker under timed
condition is 98.8%, which is close to the average login success rate
under normal condition.
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Figure 6: Impact of time pressure
For each scheme, a random password is generated to each par-
ticipant. The participants are allowed to trigger “Show Password”
functionality by swiping up with one finger on the touch pad if they
forget their passwords. Our results show that no “Show Password”
is triggered in the tests under normal condition for gTapper. For
gRotator and gTalker, the average number of “Show Password” is
generally higher in the tests appearing at first position than the tests
at the other positions. In the tests appearing at the last position, the
average number of “Show Password” decreases to only 0.1 times
for gRotator and 0 times for gTalker. The results imply that our
schemes do not incur significant interference on password recall.
4.2.1 Comparison with Existing Password Entry
Method on Smart Glasses in Practice
We compare our password entry schemes with the existing real-
world password entry method adopted by Google Glass based on
the security-deployability-usability metrics [2]. The existing pass-
word entry method requires users to type in their passwords in
plaintext via a standard keyboard on PCs or a touch screen on mo-
bile phones.
The comparison results show that our schemes improve security
by offering the benefits of Resilient-to-Physical-Observation and
No-Trusted-Third-Party and partial benefit of Resilient-to-Internal-
Observation because the schemes are secure against external eaves-
dropping attacks without relying on any trusted third party. For de-
ployability, our schemes offer the benefit of Negligible-Cost-per-
User since they use common built-in hardware on smart glasses
only, while the existing method requires additional PC or mobile
phone in connection to smart glasses. For usability, our schemes
preserve most benefits of the existing method and offer the benefit
of Nothing-to-Carry which is only partially offered by most of the
existing methods due to the requirement of extra mobile phones or
PCs. The detailed comparison results are provided in Appendix B
5. RELATED WORK
In this section, we summarize closely related work on leakage-
resilient password entry, including external eavesdropping attacks,
design principles, and schemes.
The external eavesdropping attacks against password entry in-
clude vision-based attack, motion-based attack, and acoustics-
based attack. In a vision-based attack, an adversary directly view or
record videos about password entry and infer the password based
on various clues in the video [18, 11]. In a motion-based attack, an
adversary may attack remotely by accessing arm-mounted motion
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sensors on smart watch. Liu et al. [7] explored such threat by show-
ing the feasibility of inferring users’ PINs and typed texts through
sensor data on smart watch. Wang et al. [12] further demonstrated
that motion data from wrist-worn devices can be used to discrim-
inate mm-level distances for users’ hand movements during pass-
word entries. In an acoustics-based attack, an adversary may record
audio signals about password entry and infer the password by ana-
lyzing the ringtones and keystroke acoustics [10].
Various design principles have been proposed for designing
leakage-resilient password entry schemes. Roth et al. [9] proposed
to use a cognitive trapdoor game to transform the knowledge of
underlying password into obfuscated responses for password en-
try. Li et al. [6] pointed out several design principles, including
time-variant responses, uncertainty, and balance. Recently, Yan et
al. [16] included the design principles against brute force attacks
and generic statistical attacks. These works indicate that it is nec-
essary to use certain secure channel between a user and the device
during password entry so as to achieve provable security and high
usability. Our schemes are designed following these principles.
Many user authentication schemes have been proposed to
achieve leakage resilience. Ginzburg et al. [4] proposed a scheme
where a user needs to memorize a formula so that user authenti-
cation can be performed based on the calculated results from the
formula. But the scheme burdens users with a high workload on
mental memorization and calculation. Weinshal [13] designed a
schemes, CAS, relying on the cognitive capability of human be-
ings. In CAS, a user needs to identify about 30 secret pictures
and find out a path among 80 pictures randomly displayed on the
screen in a single round. An authentication attempt includes 10
rounds. According to the user study conducted in [13], CAS im-
poses a high usability cost, which may take up to 221 seconds per
login attempt. A recent work, named CoverPad, was proposed to
protect the password entry process on mobile phones and tablet-
s [16] with acceptable usability. CoverPad leverages on a tempo-
rary secure channel between user and touch screen for transforming
a password during password entry. CoverPad is designed for mo-
bile phones and tablets with a standard touch screen. Due to the
compact and lightweight design of smart glasses, it is difficult to
apply the existing schemes on smart glasses.
Recently, Winkler et al. [14] proposed GlassUnlock which dis-
plays a randomized number pad on Google Glass and a blank key-
pad on mobile phone simultaneously. To enter a password, a user
needs to press on the corresponding keys on mobile phone based
on the number pad on Google Glass. A disadvantage of GlassUn-
lock is that users have to switch between Google Glass and mobile
phone, which leads to interrupted usage experience. Another two
schemes, namely VB-PIN and TB-PIN [15], improve GlassUnlock
in terms of usability. The two schemes shuffle the number pad once
and display it on the NED screen. To enter a password, a user is
required to speak out the position of each password element in VB-
PIN or tap the touch pad in TB-PIN. However, they are subject to
partial password leakage as an adversary may know certain infor-
mation about an input password. For example, if a password con-
tains two or more identical password elements, the adversary can
know the distribution of these identical password elements. In ad-
dition, the user may spend more time locating the correct password
elements on a completely shuffled number pad. In comparison, our
schemes do not require any additional device or hardware. It is eas-
ier for users to locate the password elements in the hidden keypad
and perform simple and intuitive operations uninterruptedly with
our schemes on smart glasses. Moreover, our schemes can achieve
zero leakage (except password length) in password entry against
the eavesdropping attacks.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose three leakage-resilient password en-
try schemes for smart glasses. The schemes are proven to achieve
zero leakage in password entry against the eavesdropping attacks.
The schemes require no extra hardware beyond what is common-
ly available on smart glasses, nor additional device beyond smart
glasses. The usability of our schemes is evaluated in a user study
which shows that our schemes are easy to use in various scenarios.
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APPENDIX
A. SECURITY PROOF
A.1 Security Proof of gTapper
For gTapper, in each round i, an adversary knows the number and
the directions of shifts. However, due to the protected hidden key-
pad, the adversary does not know what the initially focused number
is and therefore cannot infer the i-th element of the password.
Proof: Given the user operation opi in any round i, the ini-
tially focused number si, and any two elements px and py in a
w-sized password alphabet (password alphabet {0, 1, 2, ..., 9} with
w = 10), let Pr(opi|px) and Pr(opi|py) be the probabilities for
the operation opi when the underlying password elements are px
and py , respectively. If the observed user operation is swiping for-
ward, we have Pr(opi|px) = Pr(opi = si − px mod w) =
Pr(si = px+opi mod w) = Pr(si = C) = 1/w = Pr(opi|py)
for any i, x, and y, where C can by any integer randomly drawn
from {0, 1, 2, ..., 9}. If the observed user operation is swiping
backward, we have Pr(opi|px) = Pr(opi = px − si mod w) =
Pr(si = px−opi mod w) = Pr(si = C) = 1/w = Pr(opi|py)
for any i, x, and y, where C can by any integer randomly drawn
from {0, 1, 2, ..., 9}. Thus the sequence of the user operations ob-
served by an adversary is equivalent to a random sequence. The ad-
versary cannot distinguish the i-th element in the underlying pass-
word between any two elements in the password alphabet. 
A.2 Security Proof of gRotator
For gRotator, an adversary may know in each round whether the
user changes the number screen and know the exact positions of
the underlying password elements in the displayed screen. But the
adversary would not know which number screen is chosen nor the
mapping between the numbers and the positions in the screen. So
the adversary cannot infer any element of the underlying password.
Proof: Given the user operation opi in any round i and any two
elements px and py in 10-sized password alphabet {0, 1, 2, ..., 9},
let Pr(opi|px) and Pr(opi|py) be the probabilities for the opera-
tion opi when the underlying password elements are px and py , re-
spectively. Based on the design of gRotator, one of the two number
screens Cs and Cb is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution
and displayed initially (i.e. with a probability of 1
2
). Each number
screen contains 5 numbers whose positions are randomly shuffled.
Thus we have Pr(opi|px) = 12 · Pr(px ∈ direction of opi) =
1
2
· P 44 /P 55 = 12 · 4!/5! = 110 = Pr(opi|py) for any i, x, and y.
That is, the adversary gains no advantage for distinguishing the i-th
element in the underlying password between any two elements in
the password alphabet by observing the user operations. 
A.3 Security Proof of gTalker
For gTalker, an adversary may know the number spoken by the
user in each round i. However, since transformed keypad is not dis-
closed, the adversary does not know the random mapping between
the original keypad and the transformed keypad. Therefore, the ad-
versary cannot infer the i-th element of the underlying password in
each round i.
Proof: Given the number sik spoken by the user in any round
i and any two elements px and py in a w-sized password alphabet
(w = 10 in our implementation), let Pr(sik|px) and Pr(sik|py)
be the probabilities for the observed number sik when the under-
lying password elements are px and py , respectively. Since the
original keypad remains unchanged while the transformed key-
pad randomly shuffles in each round, we have Pr(sik|px) =
Pw−1w−1 /P
w
w = (w − 1)!/w! = 1/w = Pr(sik|py) for all i, x,
and y. Thus the adversary gains no advantage for distinguishing
the i-th element in the underlying password between any two el-
ements in the password alphabet by observing the number spoken
by the user. 
B. COMPARISON RESULTS
Table 1 shows the comparison results. In particular, the met-
rics of security include the rows from “Resilient-to-Physical-
Observation” to “Unlinkable”. The metrics of deployability include
the rows from “Accessible” to “Non-Proprietary”. The metrics
of usability include the rows from “Nothing-to-Carry” to “Easy-
Recovery-from-Loss”.
Table 1: Comparison between the proposed schemes and
the existing password entry method on smart glasses using
security-deployability-usability metrics [2] where N indicates
the benefit is offered, M indicates the benefit is partially offered,
while blank cell indicates the benefit is not offered
Metrics Our schemes Existing password en-
try on smart glasses
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation N
Resilient-to-Targeted-
Impersonation
M M
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation M
Resilient-to-Theft N N
No-Trusted-Third-Party N
Requiring-Explicit-Consent N N
Unlinkable N N
Accessible N N
Negligible-Cost-per-User N M
Mature N
Non-Proprietary N N
Nothing-to-Carry N M
Easy-to-Learn N N
Efficient-to-Use M N
Infrequent-Errors M M
Easy-Recovery-from-Loss N N
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